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TELEPHONE RATE REGULATION IN NEW BRUNSWICK  
AND THE TEST YEAR CONCEPT
R obert W. Kerr*
In F ebruary  of  1976 the Board o f  Com m issioners  of  Public 
Utilities o f  New Brunswick g ran ted  the New Brunswick Telephone 
C om pany  Ltd. its second rate  increase in seven m onths. While the 
increases allowed by the Board were substantia lly  less than  the C o m ­
pany had asked for, a good case can be m ade tha t  the increases 
gran ted  were substantia lly  m ore  than  the Board by its decision in­
dicated the C o m p a n y  was entitled to.
In its decision the Board approved  ra te  increases which would 
earn the  C o m p an y  a return o f  13% on the com m on equity capital o f  
the C om pany .  O n  this basis the Board approved ra te  increases tha t  
would allow an overall rate of  return  on its investment of  10.4%. As 
a result the Board  indicated approval o f  ra te  increases which would 
earn the C o m p an y  an additional $2.8 million in the 1976 test year 
adopted by the Board.
The  C o m p an y  in turn subm itted  rate  increases tha t  would earn 
it an additiona l $2.8 million during its 1976 fiscal year. The Board 
approved the rates  submitted.
While the events as set out above may appear  to the average 
person as quite in order,  there is an additional factor, the test year 
concept, which upsets this appearance  o f  order.  W ith a proper un­
derstanding o f  th e  test year concept, one is led to the conclusion tha t  
the legality o f  the  rates approved by the Board is doubtful.  I f  these 
doubts  are justified, the New Brunswick Telephone C om pany  Ltd. 
will during 1976 collect from its subscribers in New Brunswick a p ­
proxim ately  h a l f  a million dollars m ore  than it is entitled to.
The  test yea r  concept is well-known in ra te  regulation circles. It 
involves using an income and expense s ta tem en t o f  the com pany be­
ing regulated for a one year period as a basis for determ ining what is 
the co m p an y ’s present rate  o f  re turn  on investment and how much 
additional revenue the com pany  would need to achieve the ra te  of  
return which the regulating agency finds proper.
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Two types o f  test year are  recognized. The use of  one type or  the 
o ther  varies from regulatory  board  to regulatory  board  and from 
tim e to time.
O ne type is the historic test year. This m eans tha t  the revenue 
and expense s ta tem ent is based on the experience o f  the com pany 
during some actual twelve m onth  period in the past.  Various adjust­
ments may be made, but basically the historic test year m eans using 
actual figures.
The other type of  test year is the projected test year. This in­
volves using the c o m p an y ’s projections for a twelve m onth  period 
which is either partly  or entirely in the future. If the period is 
already in progress, part  o f  these figures may be based on actual ex­
perience, but a significant part  o f  the figures depends on projections.
Generally  the period of  the test year corresponds to a fiscal year 
for the com pany being regulated. Since the co m p an y ’s owji financial 
records are related to its fiscal years, this simplifies the preparation  
o f  the necessary income and expense sta tem ents .
At the sam e time, it must be emphasized that the test year is 
something distinct from any fiscal year o f  the com pany. It is a 
hypothetical year which is used to calculate the revenue tha t  the 
com pany would need in order  to earn an approved rate o f  return if 
approved rates were in effect th roughou t the  year. If the historic test 
year is used, the test year differs from the actual year in tha t  the rates 
in question were never in effect during tha t  year  since regulatory 
boards are not authorized to gran t  retroactive increases. I f  a pro­
jected test year is used, the actual year may differ in m any respects 
from the figures used for the test year since no one has yet developed 
a foolproof m ethod of  predicting the future. Also, if the projected 
test year is partly  over, the approved rates cannot be in effect 
th roughout the test year because o f  the lack o f  authority  to gran t a 
retroactive increase.
In its February  decision the New Brunswick Board approved 
rate  increases tha t  would produce a return  on com m on equity o f  
13%, a return on total investment of  10.4%, and additional revenue 
of  $2.8 million in the projected test year o f  1976. The com pany  then 
submitted ra te  increases to become effective on or after M arch  15 
which would realize additional revenue o f  $2.8 million between then 
and the end o f  the 1976 fiscal year. The co m p an y ’s fiscal year is the 
calendar year.
By M arch  15 the com pany was already two and one-half  
m onths into its 1976 fiscal year. This m eans tha t ,  if these sam e rates 
had been in effect th roughout the test year o f  1976, they would have 
earned the com pany approxim ate ly  $3.5 million in additional 
revenue. This would yield an overall ra te  o f  return o f  abou t 10.6%, 
and a return  on com m on equity o f  abou t 13.4%. All o f  these figures
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exceed what the B oard’s decision allowed.
Looked a t in ano ther  way, if the com pany  had applied for rates 
within the $2.8 million limit in the test year, these would have yielded 
additional revenue o f  only about $2.3 million from  M arch  15 to the 
end of  the year. The rates approved, therefore, will exceed what was 
authorized  by the B oard’s decision by approxim ate ly  half  a million 
dollars  in 1976.
Two possibilities occur as to what really transpired  in the 
B oard’s mind between its decision and its subsequent approval o f  the 
C o m p a n y ’s revised ra te  application. First, the Board may have 
changed its mind and  decided tha t  the $2.8 million allowed over the 
test year was not enough.
Alternatively, the Board may not have fully apprecia ted  what it 
was saying in its original decision. The federal anti-inflation 
guidelines were a m a jo r  factor in the B oard ’s decision since the 
Board indicated that,  but for the guidelines, it might have approved 
rates producing a return  on com m on equity as high as 15%. As it 
was, the Board indicated the com pany might achieve such a return 
by cutting costs, but not by raising prices. (Needless to say, the 
Board will have to be cautious in the future that the com pany  does 
not artifically increase costs in o rder  to obta in further rate  increases 
preliminary  to achieving the authorized higher rate  of  return  by cu t­
ting those sam e costs.)
U nder  the g u id e l in e s ,  the com pany  could earn an additional 
$2.8 million anytim e during 1976 since the guidelines apply to actual 
fiscal periods, and do not incorporate the test year concept. Thus, if 
an increase up to the m ax im um  allowed by the guidelines was in­
tended, the rates approved satisfied the Board 's  intentions.
However, the B oa rd ’s decision was not fram ed in these terms. 
T he  controlling language was the approval o f  the 13% and 10.4% 
rates of  return and $2.8 million additional revenue over the test year. 
T he  recognition tha t  this would com ply with the guidelines appears  
to be secondary.
M oreover, one could read the decision as indicating the 13% 
rate o f  return was adopted  in com pliance with the spirit o f  the 
guidelines, as distinct from the letter o f  the guidelines, since this was 
the rate  o f  return approved on the last application before the 
guidelines cam e into being. This would reinforce the view tha t the 
13% rate o f  return was intended to be contro ling  in so far as rate  in­
creases were concerned.
W hether  the Board changed its mind or incorrectly expressed its 
mind in the first place, the effect was to gran t increases in excess of  
those allowed by the decision. It is doubtful whether the Board had 
any jurisdic tion to do this since in ei ther case the decision was effec­
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tively altered. The Board’s decision as to ra te  o f  return and the ad ­
ditional revenue allowed over the test year was final in form.
Once the decision was rendered on these points, the Board may 
have exhausted its jurisdiction with respect to these m atters .  The 
only question on which jurisdiction was reserved was the approval o f  
rates consistent with the decision. The rates approved were not con­
sistent with r x  decision and therefore are arguably  unlawful.
The course o f  events in this proceeding raises a serious doubt as 
to whether the New Brunswick Board understands the test year con­
cept and how that concept is used in rate setting. This doubt is com ­
pounded by a similar, a lthough much less substantial,  discrepancy 
between the decision and the order  of  the sam e Board on the 
previous application of  the sam e com pany in 1975.
At tha t time the Board approved a ra te  o f  return on overall in­
vestment between 9.5% and 10%, and on tha t  basis allowed ad­
ditional revenue o f  $5.1 million in the 1974 (historic) test year. It 
then proceeded to approve rates which would in the test year have 
produced additional revenue o f  over $6 million. The discrepancy is 
explained by the fact that the $5.1 million figure was based on a 
return  o f  9.7%, that is, in the middle o f  the allowable range, while the 
rates approved would have produced a ra te  o f  return  at 10%, that is, 
the top of  the range. W hether the Board com m itted  an erro r  de­
pends on whether the $5.1 million figure or  the m ax im um  10% rate 
of  return  was intended to be controlling. The decision was a m ­
biguous in this regard, so that actual e rro r  would be difficult to es­
tablish.
However, the com m on practice in rate  regulation is tha t  the ad ­
ditional revenue figure is the key figure. This dollar  figure is a neces­
sary bridge between the rate o f  return allowed and the actual 
te lephone rates that the com pany  is authorized to charge.
M oreover, it is also com m on for the additional revenue figure to 
be ca lculated on the basis o f  a rate  o f  return which lies in the middle 
o f  an allowable range of  rates o f  return. This is because it is 
recognized that the income and expense s ta tem ent for the test year 
which is based on the new rates is a hypothetical one. Actual ex ­
perience under the new rates in the test year might produce either 
m ore  or less than the calculations indicate.
This is true even in the case of  the historic test year since some 
reduction in the dem and for service may result from higher rates. An 
ad justm ent is m ade for this in calculating the additional revenue that 
increased rates would produce. If the decrease in dem and  is un­
deres t im ated ,  the new rates would have produced less revenue in the 
test year than  is caluculated. But, if the decrease in dem and is 
overestim ated, the new rates would have produced m ore additional 
revenue in the test year than is calculated.
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If the additional revenue figure is calculated on the basis o f  the 
m axim um  allowable rate  o f  return , there is a possibility that actual 
experience would produce a ra te  o f  return in excess o f  that allowed. 
An additional revenue calculation using a ra te  o f  return in the middle 
of  an allowable range m akes allowance for the fact tha t  actual ex ­
perience may be either m ore or  less than the hypothetical test year 
calculation. The approval o f  rates in excess of  the additional revenue 
figure so calculated on the previous application again creates doubts 
about the New Brunswick B oard’s apprecia tion  of  norm al rate set­
ting procedure and the test year concept on which that procedure 
heavily depends.
If  the Board does not fully apprecia te  such basic concepts, then 
their ability to effectively fulfil their responsibility to regulate in the 
public interest is undermined. The public would rest easier if the 
decisions o f  the Board dem onstra ted  such an appreciation, ra ther  
than raised doubts about it.
